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Vance: Federal Water Pollution Remedies: Non-Statutory Remedies Are Elim

FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION REMEDIES:
NON-STATUTORY REMEDIES ARE ELIMINATED
A state's jurisdiction generally stops at the borders of the
state. Water and water pollution, however, flow unimpeded
across state boundaries. Control of interstate water pollution
thus requires some sort of uniform regulation. Congress attempted to meet this need in 1948 when it enacted the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.' Despite subsequent revisions,
this Act proved inadequate to control water pollution. 2 In
1972, the failure of the Act to alleviate the problem of water
pollution prompted the Supreme Court to attempt a judicial
solution to the problem. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,3 the
Court established that there existed a federal common law of
nuisance which gave federal courts federal question jurisdiction to hear and resolve water pollution disputes. 4 The efficacy
of the Court's solution will never be known, for later in 1972
Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (FWPCAA). This Act established a comprehensive nationwide program of water pollution control; but
like any statute, it did not provide a remedy for every situation. The question thus arose whether additional remedies
could be implied from the provisions of the statute.
A plaintiff who sought relief for injuries caused by water
pollution appeared to have three interrelated federal remedies:
the federal common law of nuisance, the provisions of the
FWPCAA, and additional private remedies implied from the
provisions of the FWPCAA. There was no question that the
remedies available under the FWPCAA were valid-Congress
had specifically provided them. The other two remedies,
though, were part of what is called the specialized federal comCopyright© 1982 by the University of Wyoming.
1. Act of June 30, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).

2. Ipsen & Raisch, Enforcement Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 9 LAND & WATER L. REV. 369, 374-75 (1974).
3. 406 U.S. 91 (1972) [hereinafter cited in text as Milwaukee 1]. Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the unanimous court.
4. Id. at 98-101. Justice Douglas noted that "[tihe considerable interests involved in the
purity of interstate waters would seem to put beyond question the jurisdictional amount
provided in S1331(a)." Title 28 U.S.C. S 1331(a) (1976) provides, as it did in 1972, in pertinent part: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
5. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. SS 1251-1376 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as FWPCAA]. Though the 1972 legislation took the form of amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1965, "for all practical purposes [it]
replace[d] all federal water pollution control statutes." McThenia, An Examination of the
FederalWaterPollutionControlActAmendments of1972, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 195,

202 (1973).
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mon law. 6 Since the federal common law of nuisance was in-

tended to fill a statutory void, it became unclear whether Congress displaced or pre-empted the doctrine when it partially
filled the void. Further, it was uncertain whether the doctrine
still existed to the extent that the FWPCAA failed to provide
complete relief. It was also unclear whether it was proper to
imply further relief from the FWPCAA itself when such a deficiency occurred.
In 1981, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan,7 a
renascent Milwaukee I, the Supreme Court determined that
the FWPCAA had indeed displaced the federal common law of
nuisance, at least to the degree that the two doctrines overlapped. In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. NationalSea
Clammers Association,8 the Court decided that the FWPCAA
had completely pre-empted the federal common law of
nuisance. Further, the Court ruled that the remedies provided
by the FWPCAA were exclusive; no additional remedies could
be implied from the Act. This comment will examine the three
federal water pollution remedies, and the two cases which
reduced them to one.
THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE

One source of specialized federal common law arises from
the need to protect important national interests, implicitly or
explicitly recognized by the Constitution, independent of any
6. Although Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), established that there was no
general federal common law, a case decided the same day as Erie, Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938), used federal common law to
resolve a dispute concerning apportionment of interstate waters. Thus, as Judge Friendly
said, "[tihe clarion yet careful pronouncement of Erie, 'There is no general federal common law,' opened the way to what, for want of a better term, we may call specialzed
federal common law." Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-andoftheNewFederalCommon Law,
39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 405 (1964) (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court has created "specialized" federal common law where there is
some federal policy or interest which would be served by the creation and there is a need
for uniformity in the field. Note, Application of the Federal Common Law of Public
Nuisance to Intrastate Stream Pollution, 18 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 929, 934-35
(1977). Though the Court has used a variety of techniques to create federal common law,
there seem to be two basic sources for the doctrine: 1) federal statutes, and 2) important
national interests which the Constitution explicitly, or more likely, implicitly recognizes.
Comment, Federal Common Law of Nuisance in Intrastate Water Pollution Disputes,
1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 164, 165 (1977). See generally Friendly, supra; Mowe, Federal
Statutes and Implied PrivateActions, 55 ORE. L. REV. 3 (1976); Hazen, Implied Private
Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil
Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333 (1980).
7.
U.S.
.,
..
101 S. Ct. 1784, 1792-93 (1981) [hereinafter cited in text as
Milwaukee I1].
8.
U.S.
,
101 S. Ct. 2615, 2625 (1981) [hereinafter cited in text as Sea
Clam enrs].
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federal statutes.9 The Supreme Court has created this type of
common law in situations involving commercial paper issued
by the United States, 10 international relations," and interstate
water disputes, 12 among others. The creation of federal common law of greatest importance to this comment occurred in
Milwaukee 1.13 There, the Supreme Court held that there is a
federal common law of nuisance which could be used to settle
disputes concerning pollution of "interstate or navigable
14
waters."
The dispute in Milwaukee I arose out of the City of
Milwaukee's discharge of inadequately treated sewage into
Lake Michigan.", Illinois sought to enjoin the city from allowing further untreated discharges. 1 The decision in the case did
not resolve the dispute, for the case was argued before the
Court as a motion to grant original jurisdiction to hear the
case, not as the final step of an appeal. 17 The Court could
refuse to exercise original jurisdiction only if some alternative
federal forum were available to Illinois.' 8 Since diversity
jurisdiction was unavailable, the only reasonable alternative
for federal jurisdiction was federal question jurisdiction.19 The
Court determined that actions brought to abate pollution of
"interstate or navigable waters" were actions arising under
the "laws" of the United States within the meaning of Section
1331.20 Thus a unanimous Court 2 ' recognized the existence of
9. See Hazen, supra note 6, at 1375-82; Comment, FederalCommon Law of Nuisance in Intrastate Water Pollution Disputes, supra note 6, at 165.
10. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943).
11. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-27 (1964).
12. Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., supra note 6, at 110;
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 616-17 (1945).
13. See note 3 supra.
14. Id. at 103-04.
15. Id. at 93.
16. Id.
17. Id. Article III, S 2, cl.
2, of the Constitution provides: "In all Cases... in which a State
shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." Original jurisdiction
is obligatory on the Court when a state sues another state, but discretionary if a state
sues citizens of another state. 28 U.S.C. S 1251 (1976). The Court decided that a political
subdivision of a state is not a "state" within the meaning of this statute, so original
jurisdiction in a suit between a state and a city of another state is discretionary. Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, supranote 3, at 93, 97-98. A state is not a citizen of itself for purposes
of diversity jurisdiction, Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487
(1894), so Illinois could not sue Milwaukee in federal court on that basis.
18. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, supranote 3, at 98. In other words, the Supreme Court still
has original jurisdiction if a state sues a city, but it shares that jurisdiction with the
federal district courts. The Court could not refuse to exercise original jurisdiction unless
there was some basis for federal court jurisdiction.
19. 28 U.S.C. S 1331 (1976). The relevant text of this statute is set out in note 4 supra.
20. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 3, at 99-100. The Court said that there was no
reason not to give "laws" its natural meaning and concluded that federal common law, as
well as statutes, could support federal question jurisdiction under Section 1331.
21. Id. at 92.
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a federal common law of nuisance which gave federal district
jurisdiction to hear interstate water
courts federal question
22
pollution disputes.
The source of the doctrine was not entirely clear. It might
have been based on filling the interstices of the then existing
federal water pollution statutes. 23 Alternatively, the source of
the doctrine might have been the national interest in solving
disputes concerning interstate waters. 24 Finally, the source
might have been the national interest in navigable waters. 25
Furthermore, the scope of the federal common law of nuisance
was not clear. 26 The most critical question about the doctrine,
though, was what was necessary to fulfill Justice Douglas' prophecy: "It may happen that new federal laws and new federal
regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common
27
law of nuisance."1
Soon after the decision in Milwaukee I, Illinois followed the
Court's suggestion and initiated a suit based on the federal
common law of nuisance in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois.28 The case moved slowly
through the judicial system and eventually returned to the
Supreme Court in 1981.29 The circumstances surrounding
Milwaukee H were much the same as those in Milwaukee I, and
the members of the Court were virtually the same as those who
had unanimously decided Milwaukee .30 One crucial factor had
changed during the interim between the two cases, however,
in October of 1972, when the FWPCAA were adopted.3 1 The
primary issue before the Court in Milwaukee II, therefore, was
22. Id. at 104-05.
23. Id.at 101-03.
24. Id. at 105-07. The Court said that rights in interstate streams were recognized as federal
questions, id. at 105, so federal law was appropriate for that reason, as well as for the
reason that a state was suing. Id. at 105 n.6.
25. Id. at 99. In discussing federal question jurisdiction the Court said the "question is
whether pollution of interstate or navigable waters creates actions arising under the
laws' of the United States within the meaning of S 1331(a)." Id. (emphasis added).
26. Did the doctrine only apply to interstate streams? Did the doctrine apply only when a
state was a plaintiff Couldthe courts grant only prospective relief?. See generally Com
ment, FederalCommon Law: JudiciallyEstablishedEffluent Standardsas a Remedy in
FederalNuisance Actions, 7 B. C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REv. 293 (1978);Note, FederalCommon Law Remedies for the Abatement of Water Pollution, 5 FoRDhAM URB. L.J. 549
(1977); Comment, FederalCommon Law in Interstate Water PollutionDisputes, 1973 U.
ILL. L.F. 141 (1973).
27. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 3, at 107.
28. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1788.
29. Id. at 1789-90.
30. Only Justice Douglas, the author of Milwaukee I, was missing and had been replaced by
Justice Stevens.
31. See note 5 supra.
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the effect of the FWPCAA on the federal common law of
nuisance .32
THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
became law on October 18, 1972. 33 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted in 19483 4 and evolved
through several different legislative approaches before the
1972 amendments. 35 These various approaches to water pollution control were largely unsuccessful, so the 1972 amendments essentially superseded the previous statutes and
created a new and comprehensive approach to water pollution
control. 36 The prior federal legislation had attempted to use
water quality standards to make individual waters "clean
enough to support one or more beneficial uses, such as swimming, fishing, water supply, and irrigation. '3 7 As a result,
compliance with the water quality standards could be judged
only on a case-by-case survey of the effects of an individual
discharger's impact on the ambient water quality of a particular body of water.3 8 In contrast, the regulatory focus of the
1972 amendments was not on ambient water quality, but on effluent limitations.3 9
The objective of the FWPCAA is to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters. ' 40 In order to achieve this objective, the Act states the
following goals, among others:
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants
into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an
interim goal of water quality which provides for the
protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and
in and on the
wildlife and provides for recreation
41
water be achieved by July 1, 1983.
32. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1787.
33. See note 5 supra.

34. See note 1 supra.
35. See Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 2, at 369-74.

36. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1792-93. See also Ipsen &
Raisch, supra note 2, at 374-77.

37. Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 2, at 375.
38. Id. This approach was "technically, legally and administratively difficult." Id.
39. Id.
40. FWPCAA S 101(a), 33 U.S.C. S 1251(a) (1976).

41. FWPCAA S 101(a(1), (2), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(aX1), (2) (1976).
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The mechanics by which the Act seeks to achieve these
goals are beyond the scope of this article. 42 In brief, except as
authorized by a permit granted under the provisions of the
Act, "the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful." ' 43 The term "discharge of a pollutant" is defined
broadly as: "(A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant
to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any
44
point source other than a vessel or other floating craft."
Thus the general prohibition against discharge of pollutants
applies only to "point sources. ' ' 45 The Act does not control
non-point sources because of the practical difficulties of identifying and controlling their effects. 46 Still, the Act has broad
application since the term "navigable waters" is defined as
"the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas."' 47 Finally, although a state cannot adopt standards or
limitations less stringent than those provided in the Act, a
state is free, in most circumstances, to impose more stringent
48
limitations.
The provisions of the FWPCAA most important to this
comment are those which provide for administrative and
private enforcement of the Act. The methods of administrative
enforcement are set out in Section 309.49 In general, once the
42. For overviews of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, see
generallyIpsen & Raisch, supra note 2; McThenia, supra note 5;Smith, Highlightsof the
FederalWaterPollution ControlAct of1972, 77 DIcK. L. REv. 459 (1973); Comment, The
FederalWater PollutionControlAct Amendments ofl972, 14 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REv.
672 (1973).
43. FWPCAA 5 301(a), 33 U.S.C. S 1311(a) (1976). Section 402 of the Act, codified at 33
U.S.C. S 1342 (1976), provides for permits to be granted by the EPA, or the authorized
state agency, which authorize the discharge of pollutants pursuant to certain conditions.
These permits are part of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, so they
are commonly referred to as NPDES permits.
44. FWPCA.A S 502(12), 33 U.S.C. S 1362(12) (1976).
45. Point sources are defined as:
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include return flows from irrigated agriculture.
FWPCAA S 502(14), 33 U.S.C. S 1362(14) (1976).
46. Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 2, at 382.
47. FWPCAA S502(7), 33 U.S.C. S 1362(7) (1976). It is generally recognized that the term is
not to be restricted to include only waters that are navigable in fact; instead, the term is
to be given its broadest possible construction. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT
OF THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, reprintedin SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D
CONG., 1ST SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT

AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 178 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY]. HOUSE CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE,

id. at 250.
48. FWPCAA
49. FWPCAA

5510, 33 U.S.C. S 1370 (1976).
5 309, 33 U.S.C. S 1319 (1976).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss1/4
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Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, or
the authorized state agency, determines that there exists a
violation of a permit, she can either: 1) issue to the violator an
order to comply with the terms and conditions of the permit, or
2) bring a civil action against the violator for appropriate
relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction. 0 Furthermore, a violator can be assessed civil and criminal
6
penalties. '
Citizen Suits
The FWPCAA also provides for private citizens to participate in the enforcement procedure:
any citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf(1) against any person (including (i) the United States,
and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or
agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be
in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a
failure of the Administrator to perform any act or
duty under this Act which is not discretionary with
the Administrator. 52
The violation of an "effluent standard or limitation" includes
unlawful acts under the general prohibition and violations of
NPDES permits. 58 The term "citizen" is defined as "a person
or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected.''54 Thus, in order to sue under the citizen suit provision a plaintiff must assert that she herself was injured or will
be injured as a result of the violation, in accordance with the
standing requirements of SierraClub v. Morton.5 5 The federal
50. FWPCAA S 309(a), (b), 33 U.S.C. S 1319(a), (b) (1976).
51. FWPCA.A S 309(c), (d), 33 U.S.C. S 1319(c), (d) (1976).
52. FWPCAA S 505(a), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(a) (1976).
53. FWPCAA S 505(f), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(f) (1976).

54. FWPCAA S 505(g), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(g) (1976).
55. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The injury asserted can be a non-economic injury to an environmental interest: "the interest alleged to have been injured 'may reflect "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational" as well as economic values.' "Id. at 738. Further, the fact that
the environmental injury asserted is shared by many other citizens does not prevent any
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district courts are granted jurisdiction to hear citizen suits,
irrespective of the amount in controversy or citizenship of the
parties.16
Limitations on Citizen Suits
There are several important limitations on the availability
of citizen suits. At least sixty days prior to commencing an
action against a violator, a prospective plaintiff must provide
the EPA Administrator, the state in which the alleged violation occurs, and the alleged violator with notice of the alleged
violation. 57 The prospective plaintiff also must give at least six-

ty days notice to the Administrator prior to commencing an
action against her.53 The purpose of the notice requirement is
to allow the Administrator, the state, and the alleged violator
an opportunity to abate the violation.59 Further, the notice
provision indicates that Congress intended for the primary
responsibility for enforcement to reside in the EPA and state
agencies; citizen enforcement is allowed only if the primary
enforcers fail to fulfill their responsibilities.6 0 A further limitation that can act both as a deterrent and an incentive to citizen

suits is the provision allowing the court to "award costs of
litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness
fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award

is appropriate." 61 Further, if a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction is sought, the court can require the
plaintiff to file a bond or other security in accordance with
62
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c).

Another limitation is that a private citizen cannot initiate a
suit if:
one citizen from asserting her individual injury as the basis of the suit. Id. at 734. An
organization can assert the injuries of its members. Id. at 739. Injury in fact, to individual
rsons, however, must be asserted; mere expertise, special interest, or concern will not
sufficient to establish "adverse effect." Id. at 739.40.
That the Sierra Club v. Morton "injury in fact" test was to be the standard for determining if a party qualifies as a "citizen" is made clear by the Conference Report on the
1972 Amendments. See CONF. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 145-46, reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 47, at 328-29.

56. FWPCAA S 505(a), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(a) (1976). The court can enforce the permits or
orders, or order the Administrator to perform her duties. Further, the court can assess
civil penalties against the violator as provided in Section 309(d). Id.
57. FWPCAA S 505(bX1XA), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(bX1XA) (1976).
58. FWPCAA S 505(bX2), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(bX2) (1976).
59. Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 2, at 414.
60. Id.
61. FWPCAA S 505(d), 33 U.S.C. J 1365(d) (1976) (emphasis added).
62. FWPCAA S 505(d), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(d) (1976). The rule provides that no temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction can be obtained unless the applicant provides
security for the payment of costs and damages to parties who are wrongfully enjoined or
restrained. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss1/4

8

Vance: Federal Water Pollution Remedies: Non-Statutory Remedies Are Elim

1982

COMMENTS

113

the Administrator or State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a
court of the United States, or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in
any such action in a court of the United 63States any
citizen may intervene as a matter of right.
This provision is not entirely clear, but it appears that despite
the language "diligently prosecuting," a citizen is precluded
from instituting a separate citizen's suit if the Administrator
or State has initiated any enforcement action-whether or not
the citizen considers the "diligence" adequate. 64 Furthermore,
it appears from the language of the statute that a citizen can
intervene as a matter of right only if the Administrator has
initiated an enforcement action in federal court.6 5 If the state
has commenced an enforcement action in state court, there is
right because the court is not "a
arguably no intervention of 66
States."
United
the
court of
The citizen suit provision also includes the limitation that a
citizen suit can be commenced only against one "who is alleged
to be in violation" of a permit or order. 67 Thus, a citizen cannot
bring an action to enjoin a potential violation. 68 It should also
be noted that even if a violation and damage has already occurred, a court can only enforce the order or permit and assess
civil penalties; it can not award damages to the injured plaintiff. 69 Finally, as long as a discharger is in compliance with the
terms and conditions of a permit issued pursuant to the act, he
is deemed in compliance for purposes of the citizen suit provisions, and for the general prohibition provisions.7 0 Irrespective
of harm caused by the pollution, he is immune to both citizen
suits and enforcement actions by the Administrator.
The Savings Clause of the Citizen Suit Provision
An element of the citizen suit provision which figured
greatly in the controversies in both Milwaukee H and Sea
Clammers is the "savings clause." This clause provides:
63. FWPCAA 5 505(bXIXB), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(bX1XB) (1976).
64. Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 2, at 415.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

FWPCAA S 505(aX2), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(aX2) (1976).
Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 2, at 415.
FWPCAA 5 505(aX1), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(aX1) (1976).
Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 2, at 413.
FWPCAA S 505(a), 33 U.S.C. 1365(a) (1976).

70. FWPCAA S 402(k), 33 U.S.C. S 1342(k) (1976).
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Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute
or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent
standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including 71
relief against the Administrator or a State
agency).
One of the critical issues in Milwaukee I was whether the
whole Act, or only "this section" could not restrict other rights
of action. 72 In Sea Clammers, one of the key issues was
whether the fact
that the savings clause preserves the rights of
"any person ' 73 (while the citizen suit provision confers the
right to sue only on the more restricted "citizens") 7 4 is indicative of a Congressional intent to create a right of action for
parties with no economic injury to sue in the general public interest, while leaving the rights of economically injured parties
unaffected. 75 A further issue involving the savings clause was
whether the clause preserved rights under any statute, including implied rights under the FWPCAA, or whether it
76
preserved rights only under any other statute.
Impact of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972
Since the FWPCAA followed so closely on the heels of
Milwaukee I, the lower federal courts were not entirely certain
whether the Act had pre-empted the federal common law of
nuisance. Subject to various limitations, though, the majority
of courts which directly considered the question found that
federal common law still existed. 77 The primary concerns of
71. FWPCAA S 505(e), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(e) (1976).
72. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1797-1800. The Court also

discussed, but did not decide, whether "common law" includedfederal common law. Id. at
1798.
73. The Act defines "person" as "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State,

municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a state, or any interstate body."
FWPCAA S 502(5), 33 U.S.C. S 1362(5) (1976).

74. The citizen suit provision defines citizen as a person who has an "interest which is or may
be adversely affected." FWPCAA S 505(e), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(e) (1976).

75. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, supra note 8, at
2623-25.

76. Id. at 2624.
77. See, e.g., Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539

F.2d 1006, 1008-09 (4th Cir. 1976) ("We may take as established that there is a body of
federal common law by which a public nuisance in one state which infringes upon the environmental and ecological rights of another state may be abated" but "itwould be an
anomaly to hold that there was a body of federal common law which proscribes conduct
which the 1972 Act of Congress legitimates."); California Tahoe Regional Planning Agen-

cy v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181, 193 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979)
(dismissed for failure to state a claim, but stated that federal common law claim not af-

fected); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 611 (3rd Cir, 1974), cert.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss1/4

10

Vance: Federal Water Pollution Remedies: Non-Statutory Remedies Are Elim

1982

COMMENTS

115

the lower federal courts were the questions identified earlier:
whether the federal common law of nuisance applied only to interstate streams;78 whether the doctrine could be invoked by
private parties, as well as States; 79 and whether the courts
could use the doctrine to award damages, as well as injunctive
relief.80 Some lower federal courts also examined the question
of whether the citizen suit provision of the FWPCAA provided
the exclusive method of citizen enforcement of the Act, or
whether other private rights of action could be implied from
the provisions of the Act.81 The Supreme Court settled all of
these issues in Milwaukee I and Sea Clammers.
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION IMPLIED
FROM FEDERAL STATUTES

Since the citizen suit provision of the FWPCAA was subject to so many limitations, and since the provision did not
authorize courts to award damages, some plaintiffs asked
courts to imply additional remedies from the provisions of the
FWPCAA. Implied private rights of action are based on the
idea that "disregard of the command of the statute is a
wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class
to
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right' '82
recover the damages from the party in default is implied.
The reach of judicially implied remedies has varied through the
years as the Court has attempted to define a standard for
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975) (dicta, federal common law of nuisance not pre-empted); Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated, 49 U.S.L.W.
3978 (U.S. June 30, 1981) (federal common law of nuisance fills statutory interstices).
78. Compare Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., supra note 77, at 630 (interstate effect immaterial), with Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train,
supra note 77, at 1009 (interstate effect must be alleged).
79. Compare Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1281-82 (D. Conn. 1976), a~f'd mem.
sub nom. East End Yacht Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977) (only
states can invoke the federal common law of nuisance), with United States v. Stoeco
Homes, supra note 77, at 611 (U.S. government can invoke federal common law of
nuisance), and City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008,
1018-19 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Louisville and Jefferson County
Metropolitan Sewer District v. City of Evansville, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980) (if state's interests are implicated, a municipality can invoke the federal common law of nuisance),
and Byram River v. Village of Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(allowed private corporation and private individual, as well as municipal corporation, to
invoke federal common law of nuisance).
80. Compare Parsell v. Shell Ol Co., supra note 79, at 1281-82 (no damages), with National
Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1223, 1235 (3d Cir. 1980), revd sub
nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, supranote 8.
81. Compare Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 699-700 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 83-84
(2d Cir. 1975) (both cases held that failure to comply with the 60-day notice provision of
Section 505(b) was not a bar to a private suit), with City of Highland Park v. Train, 519
F.2d 681, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975) (failure to comply with the notice provision in the
substantially similar Clean Air Act citizen suit provision was absolute bar to private suit).
82. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
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determining when implication is proper.8 3 By 1975, when it
decided Cort v. Ash, 84 the Supreme Court appeared to have
fashioned a workable test.
Cort defined several factors which must be considered in
deciding whether to imply a private remedy from a statute
which did not expressly provide one. These factors are:
1) is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted"... that is, does the
statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff?.. ...
2) is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one?...
3) is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff?...
4) is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law? 5
The Cort factors seemed to represent a fair synthesis of the
various ad hoc approaches the Court had taken in the past, 86
though the fourth factor had never before been applied
7
directly.8
Cases decided subsequent to Cort utilized the factors it
suggested, but as was emphatically declared in Touche Ross
and Co. v. Redington,88 the Cort factors were relevant but not
binding on the Court. In Redington, Justice Rehnquist asserted
that the Cort factors were not all entitled to equal weight;
instead, the "central inquiry remains whether Congress
intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private
cause of action." 8 9 Under the Redington analysis, if a court can
83. See generally Hazen, supra note 6; Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under
FederalLaw, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 33 (1979); Mowe, supra note 6; McMahon & Rodos,
Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisaland Retrenchment, 80
DICK. L. REV. 167 (1976); Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory
Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963).

84. 422 U.S. 66 (1975) [hereinafter cited in text as Cort].
85. Id. at 78 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
86. Id.
87. See Hazen, supra note 6, at 1359; McMahon & Rodos, supra note 83, at 191.

88. 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1978) [hereinafter cited in text as Redington].
89. Id.
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not find any evidence of a legislative intent to create a private
remedy, it is bound by that conclusion, and cannot move on to
consider the remaining Cort factors 0 In Redington, the Court
also enunciated principles of statutory construction for courts
to apply when the legislative history is silent or ambiguous. 9 1
These principles further limit the implication of private
remedies.
After Redington, legislative intent is the primary, and
perhaps determinative, inquiry in judicial implication of
private remedies. The obvious inconsistency between
legislative intent to provide a private remedy, and the failure
to so provide which makes judicial implication necessary,
indicates that only rarely will a court be free to imply a private
right of action. Certainly if the statute provides an express
remedy, whether administrative or a limited private right,
courts must be reluctant to imply an additional remedy. 92
While the recent constriction of the field of implied remedies
has been fairly severe, the doctrine still has some vitality. 93 By
the summer of 1981, though, it was clear that the Supreme
Court was weary of handling cases brought under the doctrine,
and was determined to limit its scope. 9 4 It was in this atmosphere that the National Sea Clammers Association
asserted their claim to a private right of action for damages
90. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra note 88, at 576. See Steinberg, supra note 83, at
42-43.
91. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra note 88, at 569-74. These principles are (1) if a
statute is aimed at the prevention of future harm, rather than redressing injuries, caused
by violation of the statute, implication should not occur; (2) if other sections of the same
act which surround the statute in question expressly contain private remedies, implication should not occur since the inference is Congress knew how to provide a remedy if it
wished to do so; (3) if another statute provides an express civil remedy that is aimed at the
same type of conduct as the statute at issue, and the two statutes were passed contemporaneously, a court should not imply a remedy that "is significantly broader than the
remedy that Congress chose to provide." Id. at 574.
92. Id. at 574; Cort v. Ash, supra note 84, at 79.
93. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). One commentator, Hazen,
supra note 6, at 1384, argues that the Supreme Court is likely to continue to imply
private rights of action under certain civil rights and securities statutes, and only rarely
under other types of statutes.
94. See, e.g., Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra note 93, at
741. That case was the only Supreme Court case since Cort v. Ash, supra note 84, to find
an implied private right of action in a federal statute. In all the other post-Cort cases in
which the Court has been asked to imply a private remedy from a federal statute, the
Court has declined to do so. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., U.S.
., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, __
U.S. __,
1775 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, __

, 101 S. Ct.
U.S. 101 S. Ct. 1451 (1981);

Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, supra note 88. This list is not complete.
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which would be implied from the provisions of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. 95
THE SUPREME COURT LIMITS FEDERAL
REMEDIES FOR WATER POLLUTION

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan
On May 19, 1972, less than one month after the decision 9in6
Milwaukee I, Illinois again filed suit against Milwaukee.
Before the case went to trial, Milwaukee obtained an NPDES
permit for its discharges, but failed to comply fully with its
conditions. 9 7 The authorized Wisconsin state agency brought
an enforcement action in state court.9 8 On May 25, 1977, the
state court ordered Milwaukee to meet the conditions of the
permit and set up a timetable for constructing facilities to
handle overflows.9 9 On July 29, 1977, the federal district court
judge in Illinois found that Illinois had proved the existence of
a nuisance under the federal common law. 100 The judge issued
an order requiring Milwaukee to meet effluent limitations far
more stringent than those in the NPDES permit and enforcement order, and to eliminate overflows sooner than required
by the enforcement order. 1 1 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court to the extent that it
had imposed more stringent effluent limitations, but upheld
the timetable for elimination of overflows. 0 2 The court expressly ruled, however, that the FWPCAA had not pre-empted
the federal common law of nuisance, though the Act could provide guidance to courts in deciding cases under the federal law
03
of nuisance.'
The Supreme Court in Milwaukee II was quick to point out
that Justice Douglas had recognized in Milwaukee I that it
95. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, supra note 8, at
2622. The claim was also based on the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
of 1972, 33 U.S.C. 5§ 1401-1444 (1976), which is substantially similar to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 in its relevant sections.
96. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1788. Milwaukee I was decided on April 24, 1972. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 3.
97. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1789.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, No. 72 C 1253 (N.D. Ill., oral order delivered July 29, 1977).
See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1789. The judge ruled
that both the discharge of inadequately treated sewage and the discharge of untreated
sewage from sewer overflows constituted a nuisance.
101. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1789.
102. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 177 (7th Cir. 1979).
103. Id. at 163, 164, 173.
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"4may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of
nuisance. ' ' 10 4 The Court then emphasized that the power of
federal courts to develop their own rules of decision is extremely limited. 10 If Congress has not directly addressed a
particular issue, though, there may be a need for federal courts
to develop federal common law if there is a "significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of
state law."'' 10 Even then, though, the Court emphasized that
federal common law is "subject to the paramount authority of
Congress,"' 107 and can be displaced by Congressional action on
the specific question.10 8 The Court thus framed the issue
before it not as whether Congress intended to displace the
federal common law, but as whether any Congressional legislation had spoken directly to the question previously governed
by federal common law. 0 9 The Court stated that the concerns
which cause it to require clear Congressional intent before
finding pre-emption of state law are not present when it must
decide whether Congress has "displaced" federal common
110
law.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, had little
trouble finding that Congress had totally occupied the field of
water pollution control through the enactment of the
FWPCAA.1 1 ' The comprehensive nature of the Act convinced
the Court that there was no room for federal courts to
establish water pollution standards based on the federal common law of nuisance." 2 With respect to effluent limitations,
the Court overruled the circuit court's assertion that a federal
court could impose effluent limitations more stringent than
those authorized by a valid permit."3s The Court further ruled
104. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1788 (quoting Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee, supra note 3, at 107).
105. Id. at 1790.
106. Id. (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
107. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)).
108. Id. at 1791.
109. Id. at 1791-92. The dissent argued that such an approach resulted in "automatic displacement" of federal common law without regard to its important function in resolving interstate disputes. Id. at 1801 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority responded that
even in the context of interstate disputes, "[wihen Congress has spoken its decision controls." Id. at 1791-92 n.8.
110. Id. at 1792.
111. Id. Joining with Justice Rehnquist in the majority were Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Brennan, Justice Stewart, Justice White, and Justice Powell. Justice Blackmun wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens joined.
112. Id. at 1792-93.
113. Id. at 1794.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1982

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 17 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 4

120

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVII

that although the permits did not address specific pollutant
concentrations in the sewage overflows, they did address the
degree to which overflows should be prevented. These permits,
coupled with the enforcement action which the state agency
brought, indicated that there was no room for federal common
law to impose stricter standards. 114 The Court noted that when
a federal court imposes stricter standards than those established by a permit duly authorized by the FWPCAA, it is "not 'filling a gap' in the regulatory scheme, it [is] simply providing a
different regulatory scheme."" 5
Finally, the Court considered the question of whether the
ability of the states to establish standards stricter than those
adopted under the FWPCAA and the savings clause of the
citizen suit provision combine to show a Congressional intent
to preserve the federal common law." 6 The Court distinguished between the ability of a state to adopt more stringent standards pursuant to the FWPCAA, which it then would apply to
in-state dischargers, and the ability of a state to ask a federal
court to employ federal common law to impose more stringent
standards on an out-of-state discharger. The Court held that
Section 510 of the Act contemplates only the first situation and
17
does not authorize the second.
Nor did the Court find the savings clause of the citizen suit
provision to be indicative of Congressional intent to preserve
the federal common law of nuisance. Although the Court was
reluctant to indulge in "the unlikely assumption that the
reference to 'common law' in S 505(e) includes the limited
federal common law as opposed to the more routine state common law,""" it was able to do so, nonetheless, and still find
that the savings clause did not prevent the displacement of the
federal common law of nuisance. That decision was based on
the Court's interpretation of the part of the savings clause
which states "[n]othing in this section shall restrict" rights
which existed under common law. 119 The Court stated that the
proper interpretation of the savings clause limits its application to the citizen suit provision. According to the Court, the
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1794-96.
Id. at 1796 n.18.
Id. at 1797. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
Id. at 1798.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. (quoting FWPCAA S 505(e), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(e) (1976) (emphasis in original)).
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fact that Congress did not intend for the citizen suit provision
to supplant formerly available federal common law does not
mean that the remainder of the FWPCAA did not supplant
it.120

Justice Blackmun wrote a spirited dissent which emphasized the value of federal common law as a means of resolving interstate disputes and as a supplement to Congressional
action. 21 The tenor of his dissent indicates that Justice
Blackmun interpreted the Court's holding as completely
eliminating the federal common law of nuisance in the field of
water pollution. 122 Though the language of the majority encourages that conclusion, the holding apparently is limited to
the situation before the Court: NPDES permits had been
issued, an enforcement order had been obtained to rectify
violations of those permits, and the discharger apparently was
complying with the enforcement order. 2 3 The clarion pronouncement "federal common law has been displaced," was
carefully modified by the words "in this case."'124 Whether the
federal common law survived as a remedy for one seeking injunctive relief or damages against a discharger who was in
violation of the conditions of her permit, or some other provision of the Act, remained unclear. That question would be
answered succinctly in Sea Clammers.
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association
The National Sea Clammers Association, an association of
commercial fishermen, sued multiple defendants in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking
injunctive relief and damages. 26 The plaintiffs alleged that the
various defendants were responsible for discharging into the
Atlantic Ocean pollution which caused severe economic harm
to the plaintiffs. 26 The plaintiffs sued under a variety of
theories, including the federal common law of nuisance and im120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 1801 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1811.
Id. at 1792-95, 1800.
See Friendly, 8upra note 6, at 405.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 12 ERC 1118, 1119-20 (D.N.J. 1978).
Id. at 1118-19; Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
supra note 8, at 2618 n.4. It was alleged that the pollution spurred the growth of an algal
bloom. When the bloom died, it created an oxygen deficiency which caused the death of
large amounts of marine life, especially the shellfish which plaintiffs harvested for a
living.
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plied rights of action. 2 7 The federal district court rejected
both of these theories.2 8 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed and held that the citizen suit provision of the FWPCAA was not the exclusive remedy for violations of the Act. 129 The court reasoned that persons who suffer
economic or other tangible harm from violations of the
FWPCAA have an implied private right of action under the
statute, independent of the citizen suit provision, which is
preserved by the savings clause. 130 The court also ruled that
the federal common law of nuisance not only existed, but was
available to private parties to use to sue for damages. 1 31
The Supreme Court's decision in Sea Clammers, written
by Justice Powell, reiterated that in determining whether a
private right of action should be implied from a statute, the
principal inquiry is into legislative intent. 32 To define that intent the Court first considered the statutory language. The
language which the Court found most illuminating was that of
the enforcement provisions. 33 The Court considered the
34
various administrative and citizen enforcement provisions
to be so elaborate that they precluded finding Congressional
intent to authorize additional remedies to be implied from the
acts. 3 5
The Court also rejected the circuit court's ruling that the
savings clause preserved implied rights of action. First the
Court dismissed the circuit court's distinction between injured
and non-injured parties. The Supreme Court held that the
citizen suit provision, based as it is on the Sierra Club v.
Morton standing theory, provides ample opportunity for suits
based on the public interest, as well as on economic harm, and
does not distinguish between the two. 36 Further, the Court
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1121, 1123-24.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, supra note 80, at 1226-28.
Id. at 1228-31.
Id. at 1233-34.
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, supra note 8, at
2622. See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
Joining with Justice Powell in the majority opinion were Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Brennan, Justice Stewart, Justice White, Justice Marshal, and Justice Rehnquist.
Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which
Justice Blackmun joined.
133. Id. at 2633.
134. See text accompanying notes 50-52 upra.
135. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, supra note 8, at
2625.
136. Id. at 2624-25.
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found it unlikely that the part of the savings clause which
preserved rights under "any statute" was referring to the
very statute in which those words appeared. The savings
clause, therefore, provides no evidence of Congressional intent
137
to imply private rights of action.
The Court also looked briefly at the legislative history of
the FWPCAA, but found it to be devoid of any Congressional
intent to imply private remedies. Both the language of the Act
and its legislative history convinced the Court that Congress
intended that no remedies beyond those expressly granted
should be implied. The Court thus held that there was no
implied private right of action under the FWPCAA. 3 8
The Court also examined the issue of whether the federal
common law of nuisance had been pre-empted in the field of
ocean pollution. Since the ocean waters involved were clearly
interstate waters, and since it was at least alleged that permit
conditions had been violated, the implicit issue was whether
the federal common law of nuisance still existed, at least as a
remedy when an interstate discharger is in violation of the
FWPCAA. Citing Milwaukee II, the Court dispatched that
issue with this authoritative statement: "The Court has now
held that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of
water pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive scope of the FWPCAA."' 139 In short, the Court left no
doubt as to the effect of the FWPCAA. With few exceptions,
the FWPCAA provides the paramount and exclusive remedy
for those who are injured by water pollution. To say that the
Court made muddied waters clear, however, would be
inaccurate.
CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S DECISIONS

Implied Private Rights of Action
With the earlier discussion of implied private rights of
action in mind, it is hardly surprising that the Court refused to
imply a private right of action from the provisions of the
FWPCAA. In recent years, the Court has consistently refused
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2625.
139. Id. at 2627. Since the federal common law of nuisance no longer existed in the field of
water pollution, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether a private party can
invoke the doctrine to sue for damages.
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to imply private rights of action from federal statutes. Only in
the rare cases where the stringent requirements of Cort and
Redington are satisfied will such actions be implied. The
Redington analysis requires a determination of whether
Congress intended to authorize additional remedies by implication.140 Clearly, courts rarely can find an implied private right

of action through this approach since the "legislative history is
unlikely to reveal affirmative evidence of a congressional
intent to authorize a specific procedure that the statute itself
fails to mention.' ' 4 1 Indeed, criticism of the Court's analysis
on those grounds is unlikely to trouble a Court which has written: "In view of these express provisions for enforcing the
duties imposed by [the Act], it is highly improbable that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private
action.' "142
In Sea Clammers, the Court found no legislative intent to
allow private rights of action to be implied from the FWPCAA;
moreover, the Court did not consider the savings clause to
express such an intent. 43 The legislative history of the 1972
amendments is lengthy and not without ambiguity. On the
basis of this legislative history, it is possible to argue with the
Court's determination of legislative intent. Nevertheless, the
Court probably is correct in its ultimate result, for it also could
have refused to imply a private remedy on other grounds.
Even if the Court had applied the arguably more liberal Cort
factors, '4 Sea Clammers would have been an improper case
for judicial implication of private remedies. The first Cort
factor asks whether the statute was enacted for the especial
benefit of a particular class to which the plaintiff belongs. 145
That question must be answered by examining the language of
the statute.' 46 As Justice Stevens recognized in his concurring
opinion in Sea Clammers, the substantive provisions of the
FWPCAA, and its broad authorization of citizen suits, indicate
that the Act was "enacted for the protection of the general
140. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra note 88, at 575.
141. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, supra note 8, at
2629 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, supra note 94, at 20 (1979) (quoting
Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra note 93, at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting).
143. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, supra note 8, at
2623-25.
144. See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
145. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
146. Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra note 93, at 689.
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public," not for a special class. 147 Because of the policies it has
recently enunciated, the Court was correct in refusing to imply
a private right of action from the provisions of the FWPCAA.
Even if one questions the policy of limiting implied private
rights of action in general, the Court probably was justified in
so limiting them under the FWPCAA. The Act does bestow
rights on the general public, and does provide the public with
some means of enforcing those rights. Congress did not completely overlook private enforcement.
It is also true that allowing implied private rights of action
under the FWPCAA possibly could frustrate the purposes of
the Act. The Act allows citizen suits only under certain conditions. By bringing implied actions, not only could plaintiffs
avoid those conditions, they could abuse the Act in a way which
Congress sought to avoid:
Concern was expressed that some lawyers would use
Section 505 to bring frivolous and harassing actions.
The Committee has added a key element in providing
that the courts may award costs of litigation, including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, whenever
the court determines that such action is in the public interest. The court could thus award costs of litigation to
defendants where the litigation was obviously frivolous
or harassing. This should have the effect of discouraging abuse of this provision, while at the same time encouraging the quality of the actions that will be
brought.148
Limiting implied rights of action does further the intent
and policy of the Act. In truth, one suing in the general public
interest has little reason not to comply with the citizen suit
provisions.149 Nor could such a person reasonably complain
that the remedies provided by the citizen suit provisions are inadequate. 150 Only one who suffers actual and specific harm,
different from the harm shared by the public in general, is
147. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, supra note 8, at
2633 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148. S. REP. No.414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81, reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
47, at 1499.

149. Individual citizens may not have the resources to finance a suit, but such a limitation
exists in all litigation situations.
150. Abatement of the violation should satisfy the public interest since the level of pollution
allowed by a NPDES permit presumably is consistent with the public interest.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1982

21

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 17 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 4

126

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVII

burdened by the Court's refusal to imply a private remedy
from the FWPCAA. Since the Act does not provide for
damages, this class of plaintiffs must turn elsewhere for a
remedy. Thus, while the elimination of implied remedies alone
is reasonable, the elimination of those remedies and the
remedies available under the federal common law of nuisance
is unreasonable and inequitable.
The FederalCommon Law of Nuisance
The Court's decision in Milwaukee II was correct in several
respects. Federal courts are ill-equipped to set water pollution
standards. The field is a complex one in which the courts have
no technical expertise.' 5 ' A case-by-case approach is inefficient
and unpredictable since a court must balance the equities in
each case, making it almost impossible to establish a uniform
standard. 16' 2 Further, the various interests in water pollution
standards may be too diverse for a court to consider and
balance on the particular facts before it. Ss
Another major weakness of the case-by-case approach is
its lack of certainty. Until a discharger is sued, she cannot be
sure what standard will be applied to her.' 54 Certainly a
discharger has the right to rely on standards determined and
applied by an expert administrative agency. Once an administrative standard is established, a discharger can be
assessed criminal and civil penalties for willfully violating that
standard. 155 Yet, if a discharger invests in the equipment to
comply with the administrative standard, she might face just
as severe a penalty if a court orders her to meet more stringent
standards that would require her to invest in completely different equipment. Such uncertainty and conflict are intolerable and violate the purposes of the FWPCAA.
All of the above criticisms of the federal common law of
nuisance are justified. A federal court should not be able to set
151. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1796.
152. Id.
153. Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1453
(1972).
154. Zener, The FederalLaw of Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

788 (E. Dolgin and T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
155. FWPCAA S 309(c), (d), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(c), (d) (1976). Criminal penalties can be up to
$25,000 per day of violation and up to one year in prison, or both, for a first conviction,
and up to $50,000 per day of violation and up to a two year prison term, or both, for a
subsequent conviction.
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water pollution standards more stringent than those set by the
proper agency. Nor should a federal court enjoin a discharger
who is complying with the terms of her permit or enforcement
order. The administrative agency, subject to the minimum
standards established by the FWPCAA, has the expertise to
promulgate proper standards. Once those standards are set,
dischargers have a right to rely on them. To the extent that
Milwaukee I and the federal common law of nuisance conflict
with the FWPCAA and standards established under it, the
FWPCAA must control. To that extent, Milwaukee II is correctly decided.
Justice Douglas foresaw that federal statutes some day
might displace the federal common law of nuisance, and the
Court was correct to find such displacement in the Milwaukee
II fact situation. As interpreted in Sea Clammers, however,
Milwaukee II goes too far. The FWPCAA should displace the
federal common law of nuisance where the two conflict: essentially, courts cannot establish any water pollution standards,
more or less stringent than the FWPCAA, nor can they enjoin
conduct which is sanctioned under the Act. To say, however,
that the FWPCAA entirely displaces the federal common law
of nuisance ignores the important supplemental role the doctrine could play in water pollution control. After the enactment of the FWPCAA, the federal common law of nuisance
was no longer valuable as a means of regulating interstate
water pollution. The Court, however, should have preserved
the doctrine as a means of redressing injuries caused by water
pollution.
THE NEED FOR THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE

The factual circumstances in Milwaukee II were ideal for
illustrating the inadequacy of federal courts as makers of
water pollution standards. In contrast, Sea Clammers
presented a situation which illustrates the important role
federal courts still could play in water pollution control. Not
only had the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were not
complying with their permits, they also alleged damages
directly attributable to the water pollution caused by such noncompliance. 15 6 While federal courts are poorly equipped to
156. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, supra note 8, at
2618-19.
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establish water pollution standards, they certainly are well
equipped to determine liability and redress injuries. The
FWPCAA serves an important function in establishing and enforcing a comprehensive program of water pollution control.
The federal common law of nuisance could have served an important function in redressing the injuries of those who are
harmed by water pollution. The two roles would not have conflicted; in fact, they would have complemented each other in
achieving the goals of the FWPCAA.
Rather than eliminating the federal common law of
nuisance, the Court should have examined its distinct utility
and simply confined the doctrine to the areas it would best
serve. For example, since the FWPCAA provides a comprehensive minimum standard of water pollution control which
protects federal interests in navigable waters, 1 57 there probably is no need for the federal common law of nuisance to apply to all navigable waters. Victims of purely intrastate pollution are assured a minimum level of protection, and probably
can receive adequate redress for injuries through the state
common law of nuisance. Though one could argue that the
comprehensive nature of the FWPCAA -indicates a Congressional intent to pre-empt state common law, this law probably
still exists to some degree. Certainly the savings clause,
though confined to the citizen suit provision, applies to state
law.' 8 Also, state law is deemed pre-empted only if there
exists an express Congressional intent to pre-empt. 169 Since intrastate actions do not pose jurisdictional and choice-of-law
problems, state law should provide adequate relief. Thus, the
scope of the federal common law of nuisance could have been
limited to interstate water pollution disputes.
The Court also could have prohibited federal courts from
using the doctrine to establish any pollution standards. The
FWPCAA clearly prohibits such interference. Further, the
Court could have held that compliance with a permit or enforcement order would preclude a court from enjoining
dischargers from polluting. Indeed, the Court might have
eliminated injunctions as a remedy, even when a permit is
violated, since the FWPCAA provides that remedy. Using the
157. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1792-93.
158. Id. at 1798.
159. Id. at 1792.
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federal common law of nuisance only to avoid the procedural
requirements of the citizen suit provision arguably would
160
frustrate the policy of those provisions.
When a private citizen, a state, or any other injured party
seeks damages for injuries caused by a discharger in another
state, however, they should have some effective remedy to
redress their harm. The federal common law of nuisance could
provide that remedy. Indeed, because of jurisdictional problems, it may well be the only available remedy in some circumstances. Instead of eliminating the doctrine, the Court
should have limited the federal common law of nuisance to the
admittedly few situations where it would be the most effective
remedy: where a plaintiff seeks damages for injuries sustained
from interstate water pollution.
The Supplemental Role of the
Federal Common Law of Nuisance
The citizen suit provision of the FWPCAA does provide a
means for citizens to enforce the provisions of the Act. It does
not, however, provide for damages to an injured party. 161 The
fact that Congress enacted a provision that would allow injunctive relief should not indicate that it intended to preclude all
other relief. Indeed, there is ample indication that Congress
foresaw the provision not as a form of private remedy but as a
means of enforcement: "The Courts should recognize that in
bringing legitimate actions under this section citizens would be
performing a public service.... 162 The nature of the citizen
suit is not compensatory. That is why Congress recognized
that the savings clause:
Would specifically preserve any rights or remedies
under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown,
other remedies would remain available. Compliance
with requirements under this Act would not be a
defense 163
to a common law action for pollution
damages.
160. The notice provisions are designed to allow the Administrator, State, and discharger to
try and solve the problem first. Further, the ability of the Court to award attorney's and
expert's fees acts as an important check on frivolous suits.
161. Even where civil penalties are assessed as a result of the citizen suit, the money
recovered goes to the government, not to the citizen-plaintiff. S. REP. No. 414, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 79, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 47, at 1497.

162. Id. at 1499.
163. Id.
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Clearly the federal common law of nuisance should have
been preserved by this provision. Awarding damages pursuant
to the doctrine would not violate Congressional intent. The
doctrine existed prior to and independent of the FWPCAA, so
it should qualify as "other law." This prior existence also
indicates that indulging in the presumption that "common
law" includes federal common law is perfectly sensible. 16 4 The
federal common law of nuisance, subject to the limitations
noted above, could only complement the citizen suit provision.
The possibility of having to pay damages would be another incentive for a discharger to comply with the Act voluntarily.
Even if the savings clause is limited to the citizen suit provision, it is hard to find Congressional intent to preclude invoking the federal common law of nuisance to redress injuries. If,
as the Court decided, the savings clause is confined to the
citizen suit provision, 165 to that extent it still preserves the
federal common law of nuisance. That would leave only the
administrative enforcement provisions as remedies under the
Act. Those provisions, though comprehensive, do not address
compensation. They hardly mandate a conclusion that Congress intended to preclude injured parties from recovering
damages for injuries caused by water pollution. The comprehensive nature of the Act indicates there is no room for
166
courts to establish standards or enjoin approved conduct.
The only private remedy provided by the Act, however, 1ex67
pressly preserves other common law actions for damages.
So long as those remedies are limited to damages, there
seems to be no reason to distinguish between state and federal
common law. If the remainder of the Act is sufficiently comprehensive so as to preclude federal common law damages, it
might also preclude state common law damages. It would be
anomalous indeed, if a remedial statute such as the FWPCAA
served to insulate completely dischargers from suits for
damages. The stated purpose of the Act is to clean up the
nation's waters, not to limit the liability of the nation's
dischargers. 168 If the savings clause means anything, it must
164. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1798.

165. But see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1805 (dissenting opinion), where Justice Blackmun argued that "this section" simply prevented "pre-existing
rights of action from being subjected to the procedural and jurisdictional limitations imposed by" the citizen suit provision.
166. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supro note 7, at 1792-93

167. FWPCAA S 505(e), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(e) (1976).
168. FWPCAA S 101(a), 33 U.S.C. S 1251(a) (1976).
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mean that although other sections of the Act might preclude
courts from setting their own pollution standards, the
remedies provided by the Act will not prevent courts from
awarding damages for violations of the common law-state
and federal.
From a plaintiff's viewpoint, the failure to provide
damages is the primary weakness of the citizen suit provision.
In a wholly intrastate situation, that weakness might be
insignificant, if state nuisance actions are preserved. In an
interstate context, though, that weakness can be critical. For
example, the FWPCAA authorizes states to establish more
stringent standards than the minimum standards authorized
by the EPA.' 69 Further, it is established that compliance with
a permit only insulates a discharger from actions brought pursuant to the Act;170 compliance is no defense to a common law
action for damages. 171 Compliance with a NPDES permit,
however, is compliance for the purposes of the citizen suit provision.17 2 Thus, a state with more stringent standards than the
minimum, and citizens of that state, are unable to invoke the
citizen suit provisions to impose that state's standards on a
discharger in another state, so long as the discharger complies
with her state's standards.' 73 Though the first state and its
citizens may be harmed by the water pollution, and though
they must bear the economic burden of cleaning up that pollution, they are unable to enjoin it.
The situation described above could produce other conflicts for which the FWPCAA provides no remedy. The
dischargers in the state with more stringent standards are subject to citizen suits for failure to meet those standards. In addition, they may be subject to state common law nuisance actions, even if they comply with their permits. A common law
nuisance action by plaintiffs from the more stringent state
against dischargers in the more lenient state, absent a federal
common law of nuisance, would have to overcome several
17 4
jurisdictional and conflicts-of-law hurdles to be successful. '
169. FWPCAA S 510, 33 U.S.C. 5 1370 (1976).

170. FWPCAA S 402(k), 33 U.S.C. S 1342(k) (1976).
171. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
47, at 1499. See also 40 C.F.R. S 122.13(c) (1981), an EPA regulation which states that
compliance with a permit does not authorize injuries to private rights.
172. FWPCAA J 402(k), 33 U.S.C. S 1342(k) (1976).
173. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1795-96.
174. See Comment, FederalCommon Law in Interstate Water Pollution Disputes, supra note
26, at 141-42.
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All things being equal-as they admittedly never are- an industry which had to discharge water pollution would have a
clear economic advantage if it located in the more lenient
state. Its investment in water pollution control equipment
would be less, and, since the standards are easier to meet, it is
arguably less likely to be subject to an injunction, fines, or
nuisance suits for failure to comply with those standards.
Thus, the more stringent state and its citizens suffer from
the more lenient state's standards, and so do the industrial
dischargers in the more stringent state. These inequities are
not addressed by the FWPCAA; in part they are caused by it.
The question of who should pay for damages caused by interstate water pollution, because of the economic inequities
discussed above, arguably requires a uniform answer. The
FWPCAA does not address the question, 17 5 and the federal in176
terest in interstate water pollution is unquestionably great.
Even under the Milwaukee II Court's formulation, the issue
seems to be a proper one for federal common law. 177
Advantages of FederalCommon Law of Nuisance Actions
The Milwaukee H Court is correct when it describes the
FWPCAA as comprehensive. 178 Yet, Congress and the EPA
are not omniscient; there are problems which have not been
provided for in the Act. Admittedly, some problems were not
addressed because they did not seem significant to Congress.
Still, the fact that Congress chose not to address those problems makes the need for the federal common law of nuisance
that much greater.1 79
Non-point sources are a good example of congressional
omission. The FWPCAA does not establish standards for controlling non-point source water pollution.18 0 These sources include types of pollution such as construction run-off, salt water
intrusion, agricultural sources (soil run-off and pesticides), and
175. But see FWPCAA S 402(bX5), 33 U.S.C. S 1342(bX5)(1976). This section does contain provisions allowing a state to object to actions of a neighboring state before a standard is set

or a permit is granted. Once the action is taken, however, there is no provision for redress
of injuries caused by the pollution allowed.
176. The FWPCAA is the most obvious indication of concern.

177. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1790-91. See also Zener,
supra note 154, at 790.

178. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1792-93.
179. Id. at 1807 n.21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Note, Federal Common Law

Remedies for the Abatement of Water Pollution, supra note 26, at 549-50.
180. Zener, supra note 154, at 769; Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 2, at 382.
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urban run-off. 81 All of these sources vary with local features
such as topography and soil type, making it difficult to set up
uniform standards. 82 The difficulty of their regulation does
not render these sources any less harmful, 183 and parties injured by them should be able to redress their damages. The rationale of Milwaukee II was that the FWPCAA displaced the
federal common law of nuisance to the degree that it spoke to a
particular problem. 8 4 When Sea Clammers interpreted that
concept to say the problem was "water pollution" and the
FWPCAA spoke to the entire field, 186 it produced the
anomalous result that the FWPCAA also displaced the federal
common law of nuisance by not speaking to a problem.
A corollary to the problem just discussed is that the
FWPCAA is slow to change. The Act was enacted only after
extensive research and numerous hearings and debates. New
problems, neither consciously excluded nor anticipated by Congress when it enacted the FWPCAA, will need to be addressed
by the Act, or other acts, in the same fashion. 186 The federal
common law of nuisance, however, could provide a flexible and
timely solution. The solution provided would be aimed not at
regulation of the new problem, but at providing damages for
those who are injured as a result of the lack of regulation.
Even when the problem is covered by the FWPCAA, a
citizen suit will often be unavailable or inadequate as a remedy.
As was noted earlier, if the Administrator or state has
initiated an enforcement proceeding, a citizen may not commence a separate proceeding. 8 7 The citizen suit provision
allows the citizen to intervene as a matter of right in a federal
court proceeding, but apparently she has no recourse if the
action is brought in state court. 8 Even if the state or
181. Zener, supra note 154, at 769-70; HARRIS, JEFFREY, & STEWART, INTERSTATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 64-68 (1974).
182. Zener, supra note 154, at 769-70; Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 2, at 382.
183. A case that preceded the enactment of the FWPCAA, but which was directly relied on in
Milwaukee I, Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971), arose out of Texas' attempt
to abate water pollution caused by insecticide spraying in New Mexico. See also HARRIS,
JEFFREY, & STEWART, supra note 181, at 64-68.

184. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1793.
185. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, supra note 8, at
2627.
186. For example, immediate regulations to control acid rain currently are considered to be

premature by government officials. Research over five to ten more years, they contend,
should be conducted before imposing regulations. [1981] 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 282,

411-12.
187. FWPCAA 5 505(bX1XB), 33 U.S.C. S 1365(bX1XB) (1976).
188. Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 2, at 415.
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Administrator is proceeding slowly, or toward a solution less
satisfactory than the citizen would seek, the citizen apparently
has no choice but to accept whatever result the enforcement
action brings.'8 9 A citizen who is suffering special and unique
injuries should be free to sue for the redress of those injuries,
even if she is barred from suing for their termination.
A citizen suit may be impractical in situations where the
harm has already occurred. In Sea Clammers, for example, the
violations occurred over a period of time with no apparent
injury. When the algal bloom suddenly died and caused extensive injuries to the plaintiffs, it was too late for injunctive relief
to be of any value."' There would be no point in one who has
already suffered injury giving the required notice and following the required procedures to obtain relief which will not
redress the injury. An action for damages under the federal
common law of nuisance would be the only remedy worth
pursuing.
Relieving truly injured plaintiffs of the duty of complying
with the notice and attorney fee provisions of the Act' 91 would
neither frustrate the purposes of the FWPCAA nor encourage
abuses the Act sought to prevent. The self-limiting nature of
the law of nuisance should insure that only valid suits are
brought. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a public
nuisance as "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.' '1 92 Since the harm is shared by the
public as a whole, "[iun order to recover damages in an
individual action for public nuisance, one must have suffered
harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members
of the public exercising the right common to the general public
that was the subject of interference.' '1 93 The injury must be
different not just in degree, but in its actual manifestation as
189. Id.

190. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, supra note 8, at
2621 n.14.
191. FWPCAA S 505(b), (d), 33 U.S.C. S 1365), (d) (1976).
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 821B(1) (1977). Comment g describes interference

with a public right as interference with a right common to all members of the public, not
interference with a particular use of land. The example provided is pollution of a stream.
Water pollution which deprives a few riparian owners of the use of the water on their
land is not a public nuisance; "if, however, the pollution prevents the use of a public
bathing beach or kills the fish in a navigable stream and so deprives all members of a com-

munity of the right to fish, it becomes a public nuisance." Id., Comment g. Sea Clammers
would seem to present a textbook case of public nuisance.
193. Id. S 821C(1).
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well.' 94 Pecuniary loss can qualify as a different kind of
95
harm.
One who suffers an injury in common with the public could
not invoke the doctrine; she would have to comply with the
citizen suit provisions of the Act. Only one who alleges special
harm, like the commercial fishermen in Sea Clammers, could
seek damages under the doctrine. Since the Act does not provide for damages, but expressly retains them as a remedy in a
common law suit,' 96 the plaintiff would not be circumventing
the Act or frustrating its purposes. Instead, she would be seeking her only available remedy through a means authorized by
the Act and consistent with its purposes. A plaintiff who has
suffered no special injury and is seeking only to circumvent the
procedural requirements of the Act most likely would be
unable to qualify as a proper plaintiff under the public nuisance
doctrine. 97 The limitations of the doctrine keep it consistent
with and complementary to the FWPCAA.
The concept of public nuisance attempts to strike a balance
between activities useful to the public in general, but harmful
to particular individuals:
The very existence of organized society depends upon
the principle of 'give and take, live and let live,' and
therefore .

.

. [1liability is imposed only in those cases

where the harm or risk to one is greater than he ought
to be required to bear under the circumstances, at least
without compensation.' 98
When Congress has struck the balance by defining a certain
level of water pollution as acceptable to the public as a whole, it
is not unreasonable for an individual who suffers a specific
harm, not shared by the public, to seek compensation for her
injuries.
194. Id., Comment b.

195. Id., Comment h. Again, Sea Clammers provides a textbook example. The following is Illustration 11 of Comment h: "A pollutes public waters, killing all of the fish. B, who has

been operating a commercial fishery in these waters, suffers pecuniary loss as a result. B

can recover for the public nuisance."
196. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81, reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
47, at 1499.
197. Similar arguments would apply to one suing under the doctrine of private nuisance. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 821 D, E, F (1977).
198. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 87 (4th ed. 1971) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS S 822
Comment j) (1939)).
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The public as a whole receives the benefits of the polluting
industries, and their rights in public waters are protected to a
certain degree by uniform pollution controls imposed on those
industries. An individual who suffers special harm so that the
general public can obtain the benefits from the polluting industry should be free to seek compensation for that harm. This
reasoning is especially true at a time when it is argued that
water pollution controls need to be relaxed for the good of the
public. The costs of some water pollution control regulations, it
is said, outweigh the benefits they confer. 199 If that is so, one
who was receiving the particular limited benefits of "overregulation" should be allowed some compensation from the
costs purportedly saved in return for the increased harm she
must endure when standards are relaxed. The federal common
law of nuisance would be the only practical means by which
many persons or states could receive that compensation.

State Common Law of Nuisance
Another issue raised in Milwaukee II, but not answered by
the Court, was whether state common law of nuisance could be
used to abate interstate water pollution. 20 Since the federal
common law of nuisance is no longer available, it seems clear
that states will attempt to enforce their pollution standards
against out-of-state polluters. 2 1 While the Court is more reluctant to find Congressional pre-emption of state common law
than federal common law, 20 2 many of the arguments against
using the federal common law to establish water pollution
standards also apply to state common law. 203 Most significantly, a state court which establishes pollution standards, as opposed to enforcing standards in an action brought pursuant to
the Act, is simply substituting its judgment for that of the properly authorized expert agency.20 4 It is likely, therefore, that
when the Court does consider the effect of the FWPCAA on
199. [1981] 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 62.
200. Illinois petitioned the Court for certiorari on the issue of whether state law was available
as a remedy. The Court denied certiorari. 49 U.S.L.W. 3863 (U.S. May 19, 1981).
201. Justice Blackmun predicts a similar result. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan,
spra note 7, at 1811 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

202. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1792.
203. For example, state court judges do not possess the technical expertise to establish water
pollution standards; nor can they entertain all competing interests in the context of a
single case. Further, state court judgments which establish standards more stringent

than those in a NPDES permit undermine predictability.
204. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1796 n.18.
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state law, it will find state law has been pre-empted to some
20 5
degree.
It is hoped that when the Court considers the question it
will do so with substantial deference to the needs of the states.
The common law of nuisance is an important supplement to the
FWPCAA. It should be preserved, at least to the degree it
awards damages, to encourage citizens and states to undertake litigation against violators of the FWPCAA. At a time
when enforcement by the EPA is hampered by budget constraints, such encouragement is necessary to insure that the
goals of the FWPCAA are fulfilled.
CONCLUSION

The FWPCAA established a national goal of elimination of
water pollution. To achieve that goal the Act provides comprehensive methods of water pollution regulation and enforcement of those regulations. In light of these comprehensive provisions, federal courts should not be free to establish different
regulations or to imply new methods of enforcement. Thus, implied rights of action to enforce the FWPCAA, and federal
common law nuisance actions which seek to enjoin approved
conduct, properly were eliminated by the Supreme Court.
The FWPCAA, however, did not address the question of
compensation for those who are injured by water pollution.
Since the FWPCAA is a remedial statute, it is inconceivable
that Congress intended to insulate dischargers from liability
for injuries caused by their pollution. Yet, the Court's recent
decisions in Milwaukee II and Sea Clammers effectively do just
that. In limited circumstances, the federal common law of
nuisance could play an important supplemental role in achieving the goals of the FWPCAA. By eliminating the doctrine
rather than limiting it, the Supreme Court has produced a
result, insulation from liability, that patently frustrates the
goals of the FWPCAA.
LEON T. VANCE
205. A state might argue that when Section 510 of the Act, codified at 33 U.S.C. S 1370(1976),
authorizes a state to adopt and enforce effluent limitations more stringent than those
authorized by the Act, it necessarily authorizes state courts to do so, as well. It is not
clear how the Court would react to this argument in an intrastate context. See City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, supra note 7, at 1798. It seems clear, however, that
the Court would reject the argument in the context of a state court attempting to impose
more stringent limitations on a discharger in another state who is complying with that
state's standards. Id.
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